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India's supply-led  approach to agricultural  credit paid off in
nonfarm growth,  employment,  and rural wages.  The impact of
expanded  credit  on agricultural  output  has been  modest,  and the
benefits  of agricultural  income  exceed  the costs  of the program
only if optimistic  assumptions  are made about repayment  rates
on farn credit.
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India  has systematicly  pursued  a supply-led  more  impact  on inputs  than on output,  so the addi-
approach  to increasing  agricultural  credit.  Its objec-  tional  capital investment  has been more  important  in
tives have  been to replace  moneylenders,  to relieve  substituting  for agricultural  labor than  in increasing
farmers  of indebtedness,  and to achieve  higher  levels  crop  output.
of agricultural  credit,  investment,  and output.  But overall,  rural credit  and expansion  of the
India's success  in replacing  moneylenders  has  rural financial  system  have had a positive  effect on
been  outstanding.  Between  1951  and 1971  their share  rural wages.  Creating  nonfarm  jobs has apparently
of rural  credit appears  to have  dropped  from more  added more  to total  employment  than the substitution
than 80 percent to 36 percent.  (It may have  dropped  to  of capital  for labor  has subtracted  it in agriculture.  So,
as low as 16 percent  by 1981,  but that  estimate  is  wages  have  risen even for agricultural  workers,  albeit
disputed.)  modestly.
Still, institutional  credit is far from reaching  all  The supply-led  approach  to agricultural  credit
farmers.  Only  about a quarter  of cultivators  borrow,  that has been  pursued  for three  decades  has clearly
and no more  than 2 percent take  out long-term  loans.  benefited  current borrowers  and farm households
Most  small farmers  have  little access to  credit,  and  formerly  indebted  to moneylenders.  It has also
long-tern credit goes mostly  to large farmers.  spurred  fertilizer  use  and investment  in agriculture.  It
Overall,  farm  debt has  probably  not increased  has been  less successful  in generating  viable  institu-
sharply  in real terns, as formal credit  has  primarily  tions  - and has failed to generate  agricultural
substituted  for credit from other  sources.  Moreover,  employment.
with  the rapid  growth  of commercial  banks  in the  The policy's costs to India's government  have
1970s,  the system  mobilized  more  deposits  than it lent  been high  as portfolio  losses  associated  with poor
in rural areas in 1981.  Of course,  enhanced  deposit  repayment  ultimately  have  to be borne by the govern-
services  are a useful  service  for the rural  population,  ment or one  of its institutions  under  optimistic
but one must ask what has been  the impact  of heavy  assumptions.  The benefits  of the agricultural  income
rural  credit and better financial  services  on agricul-  are at best  no more  than 13  percent higher  than the
tural investment,  production,  and rural incomes.  cost to the government  of the extra agricultural  credit.
Binswanger  and Khandker's  econometric  results  If assumptions  about the cost of supplying  the credit
suggest  that the rapid  expansion  of commercial  banks  and about  repayment  rates are less optimistic,  the
in rural areas  has had a substantially  positive  effect on  social  costs  - and the costs to the government  of
rural nonfarm  employment  and output.  The availabil-  providing  the credit  - would  have  exceeded  the
ity of better  banking  facilities  appears  to have  benefits  in agricultural  income.
overcome  one of the obstacles  to locating  nonfarm  The  expansion  of commercial  banks  to rural  areas
activities  in rural  areas.  paid  off in nonfarm  growth,  employment,  and  rural
Expanded  rural finance  has had less of an effect  wages.  The  question  is: Could  these  benefits  have  been
on output  and employment  in agriculture  than  in the  achieved  without  imposing  agricultural  credit  targets  on
nonfarm  sector.  The effect  on crop  output has not  the commercial  banks  and  credit  cooperatives?  Or did
been  great,  despite the fact  that credit  to agriculture  the commercial  banks  expand  only  because  they  were
has  greatly  increased  the use of fertilizer  and  private  forced  to lend  to agriculture?  The  authors  could not
investment  in machines  and livestock.  There  has been  answer  these  questions  with  the data at hand.
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Expanding  the availability  of agricultural  credit  has been  widely  used in
developing  countries  as a policy  to accelerate  agricultural  and rural  development.  In many
countries  credit  and the credit  institutions  were heavily  subsidized.  Recent  research  has
focused  on the impact  of these  policies  on the credit  institutions  and farmer  repayment
behavior  (for a summary  see Braverman  and Guash, 1984,  or Feder et al, 1989),  and comes
to the conclusion  that the directed  programs  have  rarely  created  viable  credit  institutions  and
that credit  subsidies  have  undermined  repayment  morale  of farmers.
However,  the agricultural  credit  programs  could  still be beneficial  from a
societal  point  of view if they  overcome  liquidity  problems  associated  with  highly  imperfect
rural  credit  markets. High return  investments  could  result which  were previously  infeasible.
The effect  on rural output  could  be so large that the benefits  exceed  the cost  of the credit
program  to government  or to society.
Few studies  exist  that evaluate  the benefits  and costs of credit  programs  in this
manner. While  many  World  Bank  project  evaluations  suggest  that benefit-cost  ratios  of
credit  programs  are usually  high,  the approach  taken  in these  studies  is fundamentally  flawed
by the  fact that the studies  assume  that money  is not fungibleY  A recent  evaluation  of the
1/  The  standard  technques  used  by the World  Bank  estimates  the benefit  cost  ratio  of the farmer's  project
which is to be financed  by credit, and then assigns to the credit program 100 percent  of these benefits.
It thereby  assumes  a oneo-one correspondence  between  credit  advanced  by a specific  lender  and the
project.  The  possibility  that the lender's  credit could  replace  credit from other formal  and informal
lenders,  or substitute  for self-finance,  is not admited. This analysis, therefore, is likely to exaggerate
1Integrated  Rural Development  Program in India (Pulley 1989) also focuses on output and
income effects of investments  financed  of credit in beneficiary  households. Formal post-
evaluations  of credit programs such as those carried out in India by the National Bank for
Agriculture  and Rural Development  (1981 et sequa) are more sophisticated. Their approach
is also discussed  in David and Meyer, 1980. These studies compare the output and costs of
farms that receive credit under a specific  program with farms that did not.  A more
sophisticated  version of cross-sectional  comparison  are production function studies (for an
early review see David and Meyer, 1980).  All studies based on such cross-sectional
comparisons  will overestimate  the benefits of credit if credit goes selectively  to better
farmers, or to farmers with better endowments  in terms of land, machinery  and liquid
capital.  Said otherwise, the cross-sectional  estimates  are likely to suffer from selectivity
bias.
An approach that can overcome both the problems of fungibility  and of
selectivity  is supply function analysis, where credit enters as an independent  variable in the
supply function. However, credit can favor one crop at the expense of others.  Applying the
techniques  to an individual  crop could therefore over- or underestimate  the supply effects, if
effects on other crops are not taken into account.  A simple way to circumvent  this problem
is to estimate the impact of credit expansion  on aggregate output.  This is the approach to the
estimation  of benefits taken in this paper.  Other major econometric  problems associated  with
benefit-cost  ratios.  Underestimation  of the  benefit  cost  ratio  is also  possible  in the less  likely  event  that
additional  credit  may  induce  more  self-finance,  because  it eliminates  a credit  constraint  for a lumpy
investment  and  thereby  induces  more,  rather  than  less, self finance.
2this approach are discussed  in Section 3.  We are not aware of other studies that have used
this approach.
In addition  to the impact  on output, interest also focuses on how additional
credit affects investment  into fixed capital and the use of variable factors such as fertlizer
and labor.  Gandhi (1986), for example, estimates  agricultural investment  equations  using
aggregate  time series data for India with credit as an exogenous  variable.  His study assumes
that credit demand is equal to credit supply and that, therefore, credit use is exogenous. He
assumes  away the possible  joint dependence  of investment  demand and credit use, a problem
addressed in Section 3.  Schluter, 1974, estimated  input demand functions  for labor, modem
varieties, fertilizer, crop area, animal and machine power with respect to credit, using cross
section data for Surat district in India.  He did not account for possible simultaneity  or
selectivity  bias.  Another cross-section  study in the Philippines  estimated the impact of ciedit
use on allocative  efficiency (Mandac  and Herdt, 1978).
Finally, the expansion  of rural financial  institutions  may reduce liquidity
constraints in the rural nonfarm sectors. And credit to agriculture may have secondary
spillover  effects on the nonfarm economy  via input, labor and output linkages (Haggblade
and Hazell, 1989). We are not aware of any studies investigating  these second-round  effects
of rural finance.
3During the 1970s, India's rural financial system expanded very rapidly,
providing  an excellent opportunity  for a quantitative  study.  After their nationalization  in
1969, the major commercial  banks were directed to expand their rural branch networks  and
intensify  their lending to agriculture. The traditional  cooperative  institutions  expanded  credit
to agriculture rapidly as well.  The first purpose of this paper is to quantitatively  assess the
impact of this expansion  on agriculture and the rural economy. We estimate the impacts of
additional  credit on aggregate  crop output and on agricultural  investments, fertilizer demand
and labor use.  In addition, we estimate the credit impact on rural nonfarm employment  and
rural w
The expansion of agricultural  credit in India has been subsidized in several
ways.  Firstly, there is a cross subsidy of interest rates financed  ftom nonagricultural  sectors
and from government resources. Agricultural  rates are lower than commercial  ana industrial
rates.  Secondly, commercial  banks cover the cost of their agricultural loan administration
from profit arising from other operations  and the government  subsidizes  the operational  cost
of the cooperative  credit system.  Moreover, relatively high levels of overdues and bad loans
build up a liability that must eventually  be made good by the government.
Using the estimated  quantitative  impacts of credit expansion  and agricultural
output, the second purpose of this paper is to attempt to estimate a benefit-cost  ratio for these
explicit and implicit subsidies.
4Section 2 sets the stage by describing the general approach that India has used
to develop agricultural  credit, and the extent to which farmers use credit from formal and
informal sources. It then describer in more detail the formal credit institutions  and how they
have grown in the 1970s and early 1980s, the period for which the econometric  analysis is
carried out.
Section 3 discusses  the analytical  framework  and econometric  techniques  to
estimate the impact  of credit expansion. Data and variables used in the analysis are also
discussed.  The impact of credit expansion  on agriculture and the rural economy  is discussed
in Section 4.  In Section 5, a benefit-cost  analysis of the subsidies  is attempted, and the
conclusions  of the paper are summarized  in Section 6.
2.  EVOLULION  OF THE RURAL FINANCIAL  SYSTEM
For over a hundred years, India has followed  a deliberate policy to build and
strengthen formal credit institutions. Initially, under British colonial rule, the civil courts
strengthened  the position of moneylenders. However, in the late 1800s moneylenders
appeared to widely  abuse their position, taking advantage  of farmer debts to take over
farmers' lands.  In 1875, near Poona in today's Maharastra, rioting farmers evicted
moneylenders  from their villages (Walker and Ryan, 1990).
5Following  the riots, legislation  was passed to curb the power of le.nders  and
protect farmers' land.  In the early 1900s, the first public sector credit societies were
established, the primary agricultural  cooperative  credit societies (PACs).  Shortly thereafter,
the state land mortgage banks were founded, which later became the land development  banks
(LDBs).  In 1935, formal recognition of the importance  of agricultu<,al  lending was
recognized  with the establishment  of the Reserve Bank of India, with a separate agricultural
credit department.
After independence,  the All-India Rural Investment  Survey found that less than
nine percent of farmers' cash borrowing in 1951-52  was from the formal sector (see Table
1).  The share of the cooperative  sector was only three percent.  Moneylenders  still provided
about 83 percent of cash loans.  Broader access to institutional  credit became the guiding
principle.  In 1969, the large commercial  banks were nationalized,  and the Reserve Bank of
India established minimum  guidelines  on the share of agricultural lending and the number of
rural bank branches. The regional rural banks were instituted in 1975 to cater to poor
households  with limited access to commercial  banks.  And the National Bank for Agriculture
and Rural Development  (NABARD)  was created for the refinancing of agricultural credit.
Table 1 shows how successful  the supply leading approach had heen by the
beginning  of the 1970s in displacing  moneylenders  from the rural credit system.  By 1971,
the institutional sources provided nearly 32 percent of all cash credit.  Debt from
moneylenders  had decreased to 36 percent of the borrowings, and other sources such as
6Takle 1:
CAPITAL STOCKS AND DEBTS OF CULTIVATORS IN INDIA, 1951-1971
AS ESTIMATED BY THE ALL-INDIA DEBT AND INVESTMENT  SURVEY a/
(rupees  per  cultivating  household)
1951  1961  1971
Total capital stock
Current prices  5356  6609  14624
1971  prices h/  12935  12636  14624
Total cash debt
Current prices  316  473  605
1971  prices hl  763  904  605
Cash debt to equity ratio (percent)  5.9  7.1  4.1
Percentage  of cultivating  households
with cash debt  43.0
Proportion of cash debt from
institutional  sources _/  8.7  18.4  31.6
From the government  7.1
From cooperative  societies  or banks  3.0  22.0
From commercial  banks  2.4
Proportion of cash debt from
moneylenders  d/  82.9  61.9  36.1
Proportion of cash debt from
other sources  8.4  19.7  32.3
From traders  and commission agents  7.1  8.4
From relatives and friends  5.2  13.1
From landlords  8.1
From others  6.5  2.7
A/  Data for the All-India  Debt and Investment  Surveys  of 1981-88  appear to seriously underestimate
debt of cultivators  and is therefore not shown.
h/  Deflator for 1951  and 1961  calculated  from R.N. Lal, 1977. Capital  Formation and its Financing
in India.  Bombay:  Allied Publishers,  151-52.
c/  Institutional sources  include the government,  cooperatives,  commercial banks,  and insurance and
provident funds.
d/  Moneylenders  include professional and agricultural moneylenders.
Source:  All India Debt and Investment Surveys,  1951,  1961, 1971.
7traders,  landlords,  and relatives  and friends  had increased  their share  of debt to about  32
percent. According  to the All-India  Debt and Investment  Survey  of 1981/82,  the expansion
of institutional  lenders  not only further  rd4uced  moneylenders  to a share  of 16 percent  of the
market,  but also reduced  the share  of lending  from traders,  relatives  and friends,  and from
landlords.- It is therefore  clear that any analysis  that ignores  the substitution  of informal
credit  by formal  credit  programs  will overestimate  the benefits  of those  programs.
Until 1971,  despite  the large  effort to increase  institut.3nal  lending  in rural
areas, the growth  in the agricultural  capital  stock  per farm was not impressive. Between
1951  and 1971  the capital  stock  rose by a mere 18.5  percent--at  less than one percent  per
year. Debt equity  ratios,  which  were at the low level  of about six  percent,  rose slightly  but
declined  again  to four  percent  in 1971.
During  the 1970s  credit  outstanding  to agriculture  grew rapidly. The
aggregate  data are shown  in Table  2.  In 1972/73  (the  first year for which  commercial  bank
data  are available),  total  credit  outstanding  to agriculture  from all formal  sector  sources  was
Rs 21,697  million,  which  rose more  than fourfold  in nominal  terms  to Rs 87,978  million.
Using  the implicit  GDP  deflator  for agricultural  production,  it rose to Rs 46,549  million,  a
115  percent  real increase  during  a decade.
2/  The  data  of the  All-India  Debt  and  Investment  Survey  of 1981/82  appear  to seriously  underestimate  debt
of cultivators  and  is, therefore,  not  further  used. For  a discussion  see Bell, 1990.
8Table 2:
THE RURAL BANKING SYSTEM AT A GLANCE, 1980181
(mnillions  of rupees)
Primary  Land
Commercial  agricultural  development
banks  societies  banks  kI
Number  of rural  and  26146  94484  2292
semi-urban  and branch  offices  (405)  (-42)  (75)
Total  deposits  mobDlized  146290  2910  A/  360
l  ______________________________  (102)  (362)  (148)
Credit  outstanding  28770  26210  26830
to agriculture  (1500)  (239)  (206)
Total  rural  72350  fI  26210  26830
credit  outstanding  n.a.  (239)  (206)
Credit  advanced  in rural  77630  17690  5980
and semi-urban  branches  (68)  (228)  (108)
Of which  advanced  to  17690  5980
agriculture  n.a.  (228)  (108)
Note: Figures  in parentheses  are the percentage  changes  since  1969/70.
A/  Central  cooperative  banks, of which  there were 337 in June of 1981, mobilized  24230  million
rupees  of deposits  in the year 1980/81,  a growth  of 535%  over  June 1970. These  rapidly  growing
deposits  come  from both  rural and semi-urban  areas, as the central  cooperative  bank offices  are
usually  located  in cities  and  in the rural  towns. It is not  possible  to separate  out  rural deposits  and
semni-urban  deposits. The deposits  of the central  cooperative  banks and of the (urban)  state
cooperative  banks  are the major  source  of funds  for the cooperative  system,  including  the primnrv
agricultural  cooperative  credit  societies  and  the land  development  banks.
kl  Total  for land  development  bank  branches  and  primary  land  development  banks.
.I  Total  credit  outstanding  of commercial  banks includes  credit  outstanding  to activities  other than
agriculture  and food  processing.
9How did the different components  of the formal system develop over the
decade of the 70s?  Table 2 shows the structure  of rural financial  intermediation  in 1980/81,
with the exception of the regional rural banks.1' The Primary Agricultural Credit Societies
(PACs) are specialized  rural credit institutions  based in individual  villages or groups of
villages.  They have the most developed  network, with nearly 95,000 societies, and are
present in nearly all villages of India.  In 1981/82, 21 percent of cultivators  borrowed from
PACs (Rath, 1987).  During the 1970s, many dormant or illiquid  societies were dissolved or
merged into larger societies, and therefore, the number of societies  has declined by about 42
percent.  The PACs mobilize little resources of their own and their credit outstanding
exceeds their deposit mobilization  by a factor of nearly ten.  Instead, they borrow from
central and state primary cooperative  banks, which together have nearly 9,000 urban and
semi-urban  branches where they mobilize  deposits.  The state cooperative  banks, in turn,
borrow or refinance from NABARD  to cover the need of the system in excess of its deposit
mobilization  in rural and urban areas.  Because the PACs lend primarily for short-term
purposes, their annual lending is about two-thirds  of their total portfolio outstanding. The
PAC system lost about Rs 170 million during the year, although  these losses may not fully
account for unrecoverable  loans.
Land development  banks are cooperative  institutions  that lend primarily for
long-term  purposes.  In some states, the land development  banks lend to farmers through
/  'The  regional  rural  banks,  which  lend  primarily  to  the  poor,  were  left  out  of the  analytical  parts  of the  paper
because  time  series  data  did  not  exist  for  a sufficiently  long  period.  For  an  evaluation  of poverty-oriented
lending  in India  during  the 1980's,  see Pulley  (1989).
10branches of the central land development  bank (the unitary system).  In other states, primary
land development  banks are independent  credit societies  and are federated  at the state level.
The typical  land development  bank or bank branch serves a wider area than a village, such as
a district or thesil (a subdivision  of a district).  In 1981, only about 0.6 percent of cultivators
(landholdings)  received a term loan from a land development  bank (Rath, 1987). In 1980/81
annual lending was less than a fourth of the total volume of loans outstanding. Less than two
percent of the loans outstanding  were financed  from deposit mobilization. The state land
development  banks raise resources by issuing debentures,  which are held by NABARD, the
Government  of India, the Life Insurance  Company  of India, and various other financial
intermediaries. The central land development  banks made a small profit of Rs 170 million
while the states with primary land development  banks lost about the same amount, so that the
system as a whole lost about Rs ten million.
The commercial  banks have about 26,000 branches and have been the fastest
growing segment of the rural financial  system. Nevertheless,  in 1981, less than three percent
of cultivators had an account with commercial  banks and only 0.6 percent of cultivators had
a long-term loan outstanding  (Rath, 1987). In sharp contrast to the PACs and the land
development  banks, commercial  banks use rural branches heavily for deposit mobilization;
deposits  amount to more than twice their total loans (agricultural  and nonagricultural)  in rural
areas.  Nevertheless,  rural loans outstanding  of commercial  banks are Rs 72 billion while
those of the PACs and land development  banks amount to only about Rs 26 billion each.  In
terms of total credit outstanding  to agriculture (that is, excluding  loans of the commercial
11banks to nonagricultural  enterprises)  the three parts of the rural financial  system were about
equal in  1980/81, with Rs 26 to 29 billion of outstanding  loans.  Much of the rural nonfarm
lending  of commercial  banks is not necessarily  related to agriculture, as food processing
loans are less than five percent of the total loan portfolio of rural and semi-urban  branches.
Loans of the commercial  banks are primarily short-term  loans, as can be seen by the fact that
credit advanced in 1980/81  was slightly larger than credit outstanding.
3.  THE ECONOMETRIC  FRAMEWORK  AND THE DATA
When the farmer faces a credit constraint, additional credit supply can raise
input use, investment, and hence output.  This is the liquidity effect of credit.  But credit has
another role to play.  In most developing  countries where agriculture still remains a risky
activity, better credit facilities can help farmers smooth out consumption  and, therefore,
increase the willingness  of risk-averse farmers to take risks and make agricultural
investments.  This is the consumption  smoothing  effect of credit.  Thus, better rural credit
markets may lead to a higher volume of agricultural  output and consequently  employment
and wages than would be attainable  with a less developed  or less efficient credit system.
The Econometric  Framework
Several econometric  problems arise.  The first is the absence of reliable time
series data on informal credit.  As shown in Table 1, the informal credit sector, (professional
12moneylenders,  commission  agents, traders, relatives and friends) continued to play an
important  role in rural India at the beginning  of the 1970s when our econometric  analysis
starts.  During the 1970s  and early 1980s, the importance  of these lenders declined.
However, time series data on informal credit do not exist.  Can we still estimate the
contribution  of formal credit? If expansion  of formal credit cause  a reduction in informal
credit, a regression of output on formal credit will measure the effect of expansion  of credit
net of the effect of reduced informal  credit.  This assumption may be quite reasonable: If the
terms of credit in the formal system are better than from informal lenders, farmers would
prefer to first satisfy their credit demand from formal lending agencies.  If the formal lenders
fail to satisfy their demand for credit (or they know that they would refuse credit) then
farmers would approach the informal lenders at a higher rate of interest.  This suggests that
the absence of information  regarding informal loans may not affect the estimates of the
effects of institutional  credit (Feder and others, 1988).
The second econometric  problem is the joint dependence  of output credit
demand and credit supply on other variables such as the weather, prices, or technology.
Credit advanced by formal lending agencies is an outcome  of both the supply of and demand
for formal credit.  The amount of formal credit available to the farmer, his credit ration,
enters into his decision to make investments,  and to finance and use variable inputs such as
fertilizer and labor.  There is, therefore, a joint dependence  between the observed level of
13credit used, aggregate output, investment  and input use.'  We, therefore, need to
disentangle  the supply  of formal credit from its demand.
A two-stage  procedure can solve this identification  problem.  Since financial
institutions  decide how many branchls or offices a district should have, the number of offices
is exogenous  to farmer demand and can be used as an exogenous  variable identifying  the
credit supply equation. We therefore, first estimate a credit equation with credit advanced as
the dependent  variable with, among others, the number of branches of financial  institutions
as explanatory  variables.  From this equation we predict the supply of credit to each district
by formal financial  intermediaries. Predicted supply is uncorrelated with the residuals of the
4/  Credit  can enter into the output supply,  and hence  input  demand  and investment  or wage functions,  if credit
is  a  binding constraint in  a  rural household's input-output  decisionmaking.  Assume that a  farmer
maximizes  output function,
Q = K'XP  (i)
subject to a liquidity  constraint,
rX = 6  (ii)
where Q is crop output, K is fixed capital (such as livestock and irrigation pumps), r is the price of
variable inputs X (such as labor and fertilizer),  6 is the total credit available to purchase variable inputs;
and equation  (i) is the familiar  Cobb-Douglas  production  function. By simple  manipulation,  one can derive
the input demand  equation  as
xe=  r  (iii)
and  the output  supply  equation  is
QC  =  Kdro0e  (iv)
where  Xe  and QC  are, respectively,  credit-constrained  level of input use and crop output.  If competitive
labor market  exists  and equilibrium  condition  is satisfied,  one can also show agricultural  wage as a function
of credit ration available  to the farmers.
14aggregate  output supply, investment  and input use equations, and is, therefore, used in the
second stage estimation of these latter equations.
The third econometric  problem arises because formal agriculture lending is not
exogenously  given or randomly  distributed  across space.  As discussed  at length, in
Binswanger,  Khandker, and Rosenzweig  (1988), both the farmers and financial  institutions
are influenced  by agricultural  opportunities  implied  in the - -roclimatic  endowments  of a
district.  That means, the lending agencies will lend more in areas where agricultural
opportunities  are better, risk is lower, and hence, chances for loan recovery are higher
(Binswanger  and Rosenzweig, 1986).  An unobserved  variable problem thus arises for the
econometric  estimation and is associated  with unmeasured  or unmeasurable  district
characteristics. This problem can be overcome by the use of district-level  panel data.
The system of equations to be estimated with the district-level  time-series data
are the following:
(1)  ICrj  =  ICr(Xjt,  Zjt,  ^,,  5)
(2)  Qjt  Qjt(Xjt,  ICrjt,  zjt, 5j)
(3)  INPjt  INpj,(Xj,,  ICrjt, ,Ujt,  5)
(4)  INvp  =  INvjt(Xj,  ICrj,,  INvj(,.,),  pj,, 8j)
(5)  WAGFi  =  WAGF,(Xj,,  ICrj, "t, 5i)
15where  equation  (1) is the prediction  equation  for institutional  credit  advanced  to the rural
sector  by the formal  lenders;  (2)  is the output  supply  equation;  (3) is the input  demand
equation;  (4) is the investment  equation;  and (5)  is the wage  equation. ICr stands  for
institutional  credit  advanced;  X is a vector  of exogenous  explanatory  variables  (including  the
output  and input  prices, government  infrastructure,  interaction  terms between  year and
agroclimatic  endowments,  the rate of interest);  Z is a vector  of the number  of formal  lending
agencies;  Q is aggregate  crop output;  INp is the level  of input (fertilizer  and employment)
used;  INv stands  for investment  in pumps,  draft  animals,  milk  animals,  and small  stocks;
WAGE  is daily wage  of agricultural  workers; A  is vector  of observable  district-specific
permanent  characteristics;  a  is district-specific  unobservable  characteristics  influencing  all
dependent  variables;  j stands  for district  and t stands  for time. The interaction  terms  between
year (t) and agroclimates  (u) allow  for a district-specific  time trend  which,  among  other
factors,  allows  for district-specific  rate of technical  change.
Ahe  simultaneity  problem  arising  out of the response  of both government  and
farmers  to the heterogenous  district  endowments  can  be overcome  by the use of panel  data
with  either  the fixed  or random  effects  technique. If the unobserved  endowments  are time-
invariant  and specific  to each  district,  then  a fixed  effects  procedure  is appropriate. The
random  effects  procedure  accounts  for the existence  of both time-invariant  and time-varying
error components.  The random  effects  procedure,  however,  ignores  any correlation  between
the persistent  errors (unobservable  endowment  effects)  and time-varying  observed  variables.
16We use Hausman-Wu  specification  test  to determine  whether  the fixed  or random  effects
model  is appropriate  for the given  data  and present  results  accordingly.
Data  and Variable  Description
The data  used  in this paper are drawn  from 85 districts  of India  for 1972/73  to
1980/81. A more  complete  discussion  of the data  can  be found  in Binswanger  et al, 1988.
The number  of observations  varies  depending  on the data  available  for each  dependent
variable. Thus, 765 observations  (85 districts  for nine years)  are used  for the output  supply
and wage  equations,  738 (82 districts  for nine years)  observations  for the fertilizer  equation,
228 (76 districts  for three years)  observations  for the investment  equations,  and only 170 (85
districts  for two years)  observations  for the farm  and nonfarm  employment  equations. The
investment  data  are computed  from livestock  censuses  of 1966,  1972, 1976  and 1982,  while
fertilizer,  crop output  and wage  data  are from yearly  fertilizer,  wage  and agricultural
statistics  published  by the Ministry  of Agriculture  of India. Cm  output  is the aggregate
index  of 17 major  crops  using  1965/76  as the base year. Fertilizer  is measured  in nutrient
tons  of nitrogen,  phosphate  and potash. The wage  rate  is the daily wage  rate of agricultural
field  workers. The irvesment varie*  are the net additions  over each  census  interval  to the
stock  of draft  animals  (male  bullocks  and male  buffalos),  milk  animals  (female  bullocks  and
female  buffalos),  small  stocks  (sheep  and goats)  and pumps  (both  diesel  and electric).-
Empoyment  daa, drawn  from the population  censuses  of 1970  and 1980,  are comparable
I/  A second-age equation  for tractors  could  not be estimated  because  none  of the explanatory  variables  has
a sigificant  effect  an the tractors  investment.  lTus, the tractor  vaniable  was  dropped.
17with agricultural  census years of 1971  and 1981. Agricultural  employment  is the number of
persons who were employed  in farm activities for at least 183 man-days  in one of the census
years.  A similar definition  is used for nonfarm employment.
The data for the commercial  banks and the central commercial  banks are
published  by the Reserve Bank of India in Banking Statistics. NABARD  has kindly provided
unpublished  data on the PACs and the land development  banks, which were collected  by
sending  questionnaires  to the state headquarters  of these institutions.9' Note that the central
commercial  banks primarily advance  credit to agriculture by lending to the PACs and the
land development  banks.  Thus, rural credit, in this paper, is defined as the amount of
institutional  credit advanced to the rural sector by the commercial  banks and the credit
advanced  to agriculture by the PACs and the land development  banks.  Total rural credit thus
reflects the agrigultural  credit advanced  by the PACs, land development  banks, commercial
banks, and nonagricultural  rural credit advanced by the commercial  banks.  A pure
agricultur_1  credit variable cannot be constructed because district-level  data on agricultural
credit advanced  by commercial  banks do not exist.  However, we also report the effects of
agricultural  credit advanced  by the cooperative  sector (PACs and land development  banks) to
compare with those of total rural credit advanced by the whole banking system (including  the
commercial  banks).  The mean and standard deviation  of the variables involved  in this paper
are presented in Table 3.
fil  Thanks  to Dr. Gadgil  of NABARD  who has kdndly  opened  the database  and personally  organized  the
assembly  of the  unpublished  banking  data. This  paper  would  not have  been  feasible  without  his  kind  help
in coUecting  the banking  data.
18Table  3:
DESCRIPTIVE  STATISTICS
Number of  Standard
Variable  observations  Mean  deviation
Dependent  Variable
Aggregate  crop output index  765  1.338  1.168
Fertilizer consumption,  nutrient tons/10 sq km  738  23.784  30.997
Net investment  in draft animals, number/lO  sq km  228  6.755  17.102
Net investment  in milk animals, number/lO  sq km  228  17.974  27.691
Net investment  in small stocks, number/10  sq km  228  5.948  15.426
Net investment  in pumps, number/10  sq km  228  1.645  2.034
Credit advanced  to rural sector, '000 Rs./10 sq km  765  283.991  421.445
Cooperative  credit advanced  to agriculture  765  93.615  203.583
Agricultural  real wage, Rs./manday  765  5.294  2.165
Agricultural  employment,  persons/10  sq km  170  235.492  196.889
Nonagricultural  employment,  persons/10  sq km  170  153.989  206.158
Indegendent  Variable
Aggregate  real crop price index  765  0.851  0.328
Real price of fertilizer  765  3.459  0.493
Annual urban wage, real  765  4373.277  1406.924
Canal irrigation, '000 ha/10 sq km  765  0.068  0.101
Number of regulated  markets/10  sq km  765  0.019  0.025
Number of villages  with primary schools/10  sq km  765  1.289  0.663
Number of villages  with electricity/10  sq km  765  0.976  0.865
Total road length, km/10 sq km  765  5.369  4.986
Number of rural and semi-urban  branches
of commercial  banks/10  sq km  765  0.101  0.132
Number  of cooperative  bank branches/10  sq km  765  0.031  0.026
Number of agricultural  cooperative
societies/10  sq km  765  0.436  0.277
Number  of land development  banks/10  sq km  765  0.010  0.006
Annual rainfall, mm  765  1120.059  964.609
Soil moisture  capacity  index  85  2.349  1.01
Length of rainy season, months  85  3.653  1.368
Excess  rainy months, number  85  1.236  1.394
Number of cold months  85  0.935  1.313
Percentage  of area liable to flooding  85  1.389  3.532
Percentage  of area potential  for irrigation  85  30.001  31.909
19The agregat  riind  is derived by dividing an index of
aggregate  crop price in each district (based on the intemational crop prices) by the consumer
price index for rural workers using 1975/76  as the base year.  Seventeen  major crops were
included  in these indices and with base year 1975. The real fertilizer price is the price per
nutrient  ton of nitrogen, phosphorus  and potassium  at the rail head, which is set uniformly
for the country.  Canal irrigation is the area which was inigated in each year by canals,
which are largely built by the government. Reulated  makets  do not include all rural
markets but only those where the government  provides market infrastructure  and regulates all
trade through a supervised  auction system. The government  does not regulate the market
price but may enter as a purchaser in order to prevent rmiarket  prices from falling below its
support price.  Regulated  markets are a government investment  and intervention  program to
assist the farm sector in marketing. Road length includes all nonurban roads irrespective  of
the government  entity that built and maintains  it (central, state, district, and power and water
district).
Agroclimatic  endowments  are measured by the following  variables: rainfall is
measured in millimeters  per year.  The length  of the rainy season is defined as the number of
months with a moisture-availability  index greater than 0.33.2' Excess rainy months is the
number of months with  a moisture-availability  index greater than one (Hargraves and others,
1985). Soil moisture  capacity measures the size of the water reservoir a soil can hold.  For
Z/  The moistre-availability  index  is a relative  measure  of the precipitation  available  for supplying  moisture
requirement  with respect  to evapo-transpiration.  It is the  ratio  of the  dependable  precipitation  to potential
evapo-transpiration.  Dependable  precipitation  is the  assured  rainfall  at a predetermined  probability  level,
usually  75 percet (Hargraves  and others,  1985).
20a given rainfall a higher soil moisture  capacity means that a crop can withstand  a longer dry
spell.  In addition, where soil moisture  capacity is very high, a full moisture  reservoir in the
soil may be able to support several months of a crop cycle without  additional  rainfall or
irrigation.  For given annual rainfall, payoffs to irrigation investments  are, therefore, more
limited where soil moisture  capacity is higher.  Icdgatian  pgential  is defined as the
percentage of a district's area inside any type of irrigadon command area, that is, the sum of
proposed command area, command area under construction  and already existing command
area.  This variable has been measured  using the Irrigation Atlas of India.  Planned
command  areas are a good indicator of the remaining  potential  for canal irrigation in India as
they reflect long-range plans.  Any area not yet included  in these plans has virtually no
potential. Flood pQtential  is the proportion of the district liable to flooding. The number of
cool months are those with mean temperatures  less than 18 degrees centigrade. Wheat does
not grow in areas without cool months and this variable proxies the ability to grow wheat.
4.  ECQNOMETRIC  REULTS
Table 4 shows the first stage credit equation that is used to predict credit
supply  in the second stage equations.  It was estimated  with the random effects technique.
The table shows that better agroclimate,  as measured  by a long rainy season,
high irrigation  potential and high soil moisture capacity, leads to higher credit use.
Conversely, lending is lower in areas with high flood risk.  As expected, areas with better
21Table 4:
DTERMINANTS OF INSTITUTIONAL  CREDIT  ADVANCE  TO RURAL  SECTOR
Institutional  Credit
Explanatory  Variable  Random  effect
Aggregate  real crop (real) price (lagged)/  -0.038  (-0.383)
Real price of fertilizer /  -0.207  (-0.833)
Real urban wage a/  .0.168  (-1.159)
Rainfall  x 103  -0.055  (0.637)
Roads a/  2.166  (5.181)*
Regulated  markets 4I  0.536  (3.598)*
Primary schools  /  0.986  (1.418)*
Rural electrification  _/  -0.357  (-1.979)*
Canal irrigation/  -0.189  (.0.987)
Commercial  banks a/  0.801  (8.565)*
Cooperative  banks A/  0.239  (1.904)*
Primary cooperative  societies a/  .0.801  (-4.081)*
Land development  banksg  -0.287  (-1.853)*
Year  -64.962  (-4.276)*
Year x irrigation  potential  0.471  (3.847)*
Year x excess rain months  -2.399  (-0.723)
Year x length of rainy season  5.760  (1.688)*
Year x soil moisture capacity  14.308  (4.339)*
Year x flood potential  -1.957  (-2.006)*
Year x number of cold months  1.434  (0.486)
F-statistic  32.63
Hausman-Wu  (Chi-square,  20 df.  25.05
Number of observations  765
Note:  T-statistics  are in parenthesis.  Asterisk  refers  to a significant  level  of 10  percent  or better.
A/  Coefficients  are  in elasticity  form.
22roads and market infrastructure  also receive more credit while rural electrification  appears to
reduce credit availability. Credit expansion  was particularly  rapid in areas with rapid
increase in the number of commercial  banks and also expanded with the number of
cooperative  banks.  Areas where the consolidation  of primary cooperative  credit societies
reduced, the number of PACs received more credit, while increases in the number of land
development  banks have negative effect on credit use.  The price variables have no
significant  effect on credit use and neither does rainfall received in the year of observation.
Based on the estimates of Table 4, we predict the amount of credit supplied to each district
by formal lending agencies each year.
Table 5 presents the estimates  of the aggregate supply equation.  The first
column uses data from 21 years, covering  both the 1960s  and 1970s. The variable
"commercial  bank branches" is used as a farmer-exogenous  variable to instrument credit
supply.  Complete  credit data are only available for the 1970s. The equations in the second
and third columns, therefore, used only data from nine years.  In the second equation, the
predicted total rural credit from Table 4 is used.  In the third equation, we focus on
cooperative  agricultural  credit and use predicted  cooperative  credit from an equation similar
to that in Table 4.  Cooperative  credit includes credit from both PACs and land development
banks.
The first supply equation with the longer time series was extensively  discussed
in Binswanger,  Klandker and Rosenzweig  (1987), who highlighted  the strong positive effects
23Table S:
Effect of Credit and Commercial Banks
on Agricultural Output
Commercial  Total Rural  Cooperative
Explanatory  Variable  Bank  Branches  Credit  Agricultural  Credit
(Fixed Effect)  (Random  Effect)  (Random  Effect)
Commercial  bank branches
Institutional  Credit  0.020  0.027  0.063
(predicted)  Al  (1.918)  (1.372)  (2.381)*
Aggregate  real price index La  0.130  0.342  0.007
(6.472)*  (1.251)  (0.011)
Real fertilizer  price gl  -0.117  0.094  0.120
(2.316)*  (1.380)  (1.640)*
Real urban wage g/  0.053  0.137  0.154
(1.497  (3.547)*  (3.594)*
Real interest rate At  -0.001  na  na
(-0.202)
Road a/  0.201  -0.118  -0.037
(6.549)*  (-0.961)  (-1.456)
Canal irrigation  gI  0.026  -0.080  -0.061
(0.827)  (-1.525)  (-1.070)
Primary school A/  0.335  0.269  -0.021
(4.322)*  (1.378)  (-0.880)
Rurl  electrification  A/  0.028  0.073  0.100
(1.603)  (1.532)  (1.778)*
Regulated  market  A/  0.084  0.132  0.046
(4.972)*  (3.277)*  (0.852)
Rainfall  x 103  0.071  0.000  0.000
(3.458)*  (3.855)*  (2.848)*
Year  -0.026  -0.041  -0.012
(4.299)*  (-2.618)*  (-0.395)
Year x Cool months  0.006  0.002  0.002
(4.316)*  (0.847)  (0.442)
Year x length  anmy  season  -0.003  0.002  -0.001
(-1.989)*  (0.527)  (-0.174)
24Effect of Credit and Comunercial  Banks
on Agricultural Output (Continued)
Commercial  Total Rural  Cooperative
Explanatory  Variable  Bank Branches  Credit  Agriculturl Credit
l__________________[  (Fixed Effect)  |_(Random  Effect)  (Random  Effect)
Year x flood potential  -0.001  -0.001  0.000
(-3.679)  (-0.806)  (-0.130)
Year x irrigation  potential  0.001  0.001  0.001
(12.0S7)  (5.638)*  (4.372)*
Year x soil moisture  capacity  0.005  0.007  0.004
(3.791)*  (2.260)*  (0.673)
Year x excess rain months  -0.004  -0.006  -0.011
(-3.086)  (-1.805)*  (-2.466)*
F - Statistic  103.936  17.632  15.460
lHausman  -Wu
(Chi-Square,  18)  44.754  33.781  31.233
No. of observations  1.785  765  765
Notes:  t-statistics  are in parenthesis. Asterisk  refers to significance  level of 10  percent or better on a two tail test.
IV  Coefficients  are in elasticity  form.
2Sof the infrastructure  variables, roads, markets, primary schools, and perhaps electrification.
Shortening  the time series, and using 2SLS, leads to a loss in the precision of the estimates,
with fewer variables being statistically  significant. All three equations  estimate a low short-
run elasticity of aggregate output with respect to the output price which is consistent with the
literature. They also show a high rainfall elasticity.
More importantly, the first and second equations show similar elasticity for the
credit related variable: 0.20 for number of commercial  banks and 0.027 for predicted total
credit.  The latter estimate is barely significant  at the ten percent level in a one-tail test.  The
third equation shows the elasticity with respect to cooperative  agricultural credit; at 0.063 it
is substantially  larger than the elasticities  for total rural credit.  This may be because
cooperative  credit is restricted to farmers and, therefore, has a more direct impact on
agricultural  output.
Annex 1, Tables 1 to 4 show the complete 2SLS equations for agricultural
investments,  fertilizer use, rural employment  and real agricultural wage, using total predicted
credit and predicted  cooperative  credit, respectively. A similar set of equations, using the
number of commercial  bank branches is reported and discussed  in Binswanger,  Khandker,
and Rosenzweig, 1989. In Table 6 we then summarize  the credit effects from all these
equations. Each number in Table 6 is, therefore, the financial  intermediary  coefficient  of a
separate  regression equation. The explanatory  variable is given at the top while the
dependent  variable is on the left hand side.
26Table 6:
IMPACT OF FINANCIAL SYSTEM ON
AGRICULTURE AND THE RURAL ECONOMY
(independent variables)
Predicted  Number of  Predicted  Overall
cooperative  commercial  bank  rural credit
Dependent  variables  credit  branches  advanced
advanced
Aggregate  crop output  0.63  0.020  0.027
(2.38)*  (1.92)*  (1.37)
Fertilizer demand  0.39  0.25  0.305
(4.55)*  (6.69)*  (6.67)*
Investment  in tractors  n.a.  0.14  n.a. a/
(1.31)
Investment  in pumps  .40  0.38  0.461
(3.59)*  (3.61)*  (3.63)*
Investment  in draft animals  0.14  0.71  0.395
(0.62)*  (1.96)*  (1.56)
Investment  in milk animals  0.58  0.52  0.763
(4.34)*  (2.63)*  (5.09)*
Investment  in small stock  0.84  0.16  0.758
(3.60)*  (-0.42)  (5.09)*
Agricultural  employment  -0.07  -0.07  -0.050
(2.51)*  (-2.69)*  (2.07)*
Rural nonagricultural  employment  0.06  0.29  0.242
(1.48)  (10.94)*  (5.26)*
Rural wages  0.03  0.06  0.061
(1.34)  (2.01)*  (2.93)*
Note:  T statistics  are in parenthesis. Asterisk  refers to significant  level of 10 percent or better on two-tail  test.
This equation  could not be estimated  as mue!icollinearity  left all coefficiei  s nonsignificant.
27In Table 6 we see that rural credit has a measurable  positive effect on
agricultural  output.  Cooperative  credit advanced has an elasticity with respect to output of
0.063.  This elasticity is fairly precisely estimated. It is larger than the elasticity of crop
output with respect to predicted  overall rural credit which is near 0.027, but not precisely
estimated. The estimate for the impact of commercial  bank branches on output is more
precisely estimated  at 0.020.
Fertilizer use has an elasticity  of 0.39 with respect to cooperative  credit, an
elasticity  of 0.31 with respect to overall rural credit, and an elasticity of 0.25 with respect to
commercial  bank branches.  The impact of the credit variables on fertilizer use is thus
between five to ten times as large as their impact on aggregate  crop output.
The fertilizer demand effects can account  for a major share of the output
supply effect:  suppose the elasticity  of crop output with respect to fertilizer use is only ten
percent, i.e.,  a ten percent increase in fertilizer use would lead to a one percent increase in
aggregate  crop output. The elasticity of fertilizer use with respect to credit is estimated
between 0.25 and 0.39 depending  on the variable used.  Therefore, the elasticity of output
with respect to credit through its impact on the use of fertilizer would be equal to 0.1 x 0.25
= 0.025 at the minimum  or 0.1 x 0.39 = 0.039 at the maximum. This compares to the
estimate of the elasticity of output with respect to credit between  0.020 to 0.064.  Therefore,
the increased ferdlizer use could account for at least 2/3 of the entire output effect of
additional  credit, if not the entire effect.
28What about the impact of credit on other investments? Commercial bank
branches,  overall rural credit expansion, and cooperative  credit, increase the rate of
investment  in tractors, pumps, draft animals, milk animals and small stock, although  not all
coefficients  are statistically  significant. (lTe impacts  on capital stocks will, of course, be
less than the impact on the rate of investment, since investment  is the addition to the
stock)."  Thus, investments may not only have affected output, but may also substitute for
labor.
While we cannot evaluate the output effect or employment  effect of the
investments,  we have estimated the employment  effect of the credit variables.  Growth in
commercial  banks, overall credit and cooperative  credit reduce agricultural employment  with
an elasticity  of 0.07, 0.05 and 0.07, respectively. The estimates  are very close to each
other.  The proportional  labor displacement  caused by credit expansion  is as large or larger
than the proportional  increase in crop output.
To summarize, institutional  growth and higher lending volumes lead to modest
increases  in aggregate  crop output; sharp increases  in the use of fertilizers and in investments
in physical capital and, substantial  reductions in agricultural employment. The expansion  of
credit, therefore, has led to the substitution  of capital for agricultural labor.
it  'Te elasticities  of investments  with respect  to credit  appear  to be high.  But these  elasticities  are not
directly  comparable  to the fertilizer  use elasticity,  as investment  should  decline  to zero  once  equilibrium
capital  stocks  are  reached.  Investment  is, therefore,  much  more  variable  than  capital  stock,  and  elasticities
are higher.
29Rural Nonfarn Qrowth and Rural Wages
In Table 2, we saw that more than half of the commercial  bank credit
outstanding  in rural and semi-urban  branches goes to sectors other than agriculture and food
processing. Confining the investigation  of the effects of the rural financial system to its
effect on agriculture would be to ignore its potential  positive effects on the rural nonfarm
sector.  Any positive effect on nonfarm output and employment  could mitigate the negative
effect on farm employment. Unfortunately,  data on rural nonfarm output does not exist.
We are, therefore, using rural nonagricultural  employment, which is available
in the decennial  censuses.  In the census, both farm and nonfarm employment  are measured
by primary occupational  status.  Individuals  are asked whether they worked in agriculture or
nonagriculture  for at least 183 days during the previous year.  Random effects regression
similar to the ones in Table 5 for crop output are run to explain the employment  growth
between the two population  censuses of 1970  and 1980, in the sample of districts under
investigation  (for details see Khandker 1989). As rural wage data are also not available, data
on agricultural  wages published by the Ministry of Agriculture  are used as a proxy . The
wage rate for rural field workers is used. 2'
The impacts on nonagricultural  employment  of commercial  bank expansion  and
of overall rural credit are large, the estimated  are close at 0.24 and 0.29.  Not surprisingly,
2/  Where  data  for  field  workers  was  further  disaggregated,  the  data  for  the  ploughmen  was  used.
30the impact of cooperative  agricultural  credit is much smaller, only 0.06, and not statistically
significant.
Is it possible to say something  about the effect of nonfarm output?  The
nonfarm sector borrows to finance material inputs and capital.  If, as in agriculture, these
inputs partly substitute  for labor, the output effect of credit must exceed the employment
effect.  Therefore, the estimate of the nonfarm employment  elasticity  of credit must be a
lower bound of its effect on nonfarm output, i.e. nonfarm output elasticities of rural credit
should exceed 0.24.
The effect of commercial  banks and overall rural credit on nonfarm output and
employment  thus has been large, so large indeed that agricultural  wages have also risen.
The wage effect of commercial  banks and rural credit are small, but each elasticity of 0.06 is
statistically  significant. The wage elasticities are of the same absolute magnitude  as the
(negative)  agricultural employment  elasticities. Therefore, the expansion  of the credit system
must have left the agricultural  wage bill unchanged. And it must have substantially  increased
the rural nonfarm wage bill.
5.  REFLECTIONS  ON BENEFITS  AND COSTS  OF SUBSIDIZED  CREDIT
In this section, the econometric  results are used to compare the value of extra
agricultural  output to the govemment  costs of increasing  the amount of subsidized  loans
31advanced  to agriculture by ten percent from its level in the middle of the period of analysis.
The four-year averages for 1975/76  to 1978/79  are used as base period amounts. Estimates
of credit subsidies  also refer to those four years.
The value of extra-agricultural  income associated with the extra credit is
assumed to be the additional  return to fixed factors in agriculture, that derives from the
additional  output.  The returns to fixed factors is net national  product in agriculture less the
value of material inputs, less employee  compensation. Using this definition for the
calculation  implicitly  assumes that, when agricultural  output expands, material inputs and
hired labor are used in fixed proportion.LI Moreover, family labor, land and capital in
agriculture is assumed immobile  between sectors.
The coefficient  estimate used for the analysis measures the impact  of additional
disbursements  of rural credit on output of 17 crops.  We want to include the remainder of
agricultural  output in the analysis. Therefore, we further assume that the elasticity of
livestock  output and of those crop outputs not included in the data is the same as that for the
17 crops that were included  in the analysis.
IQ/  If additional  credit  induces  farmers  to increase  the  material  intensity  of production  the assumption  of fixed
coefficients  for purchased  inputs  would tend to bias benefits  upwards  as it would  underesfimate  the
marginal  material  cost of extra  output.
32What elasticity should be used to evaluate benefit cost ratios?  The elasticity of
aggregate  crop output with respect to commercial  bank branches of 0.020 best represents the
impact  of that system, while the elasticity  with respect to cooperative  credit of 0.063 best
represents  the impact of the cooperatives. In the middle of the period of investigation, the
weight of the commercial  banks in total agricultural  credit advanced was less than 50 percent
while it increased to slightly above 50 percent by the end of the period.  Fifty percent
weights for these two elasticities  may therefore, be appropriate i.e.,  we may use an elasticity
of 0.42.
Average net national product in agriculture for the years 1975/76  to 1978/79
was Rs 284,162 million. Material inputs were Rs 88,524 million, 31 percent of net domestic
product.  Employee compensation  was Rs 64,917 million.  Therefore, return to fixed factors
was Rs 130,720 million.  With an elasticity  of 0.042, an extra ten percent disbursements  of
credit would yield the following  extra agricultural income:  0.042 x 13,813.4 = Rs 580.1
million.
Govemrent  Costs
We now need to estimate the government  cost of the subsidies. For this we
try to make conservative  assumptions. During the same years, total agricultural credit
disbursements  averaged Rs 20,550 million, of which Rs 13,684 million, or 66.6 percent were
short-term loans.  We assume the following  costs for this credit to the,  gogenment over and
33above the interest payments  of the agricultural  producers.  The assumption behind these cost
estimates  are further discussed  in Annex 2.
1.  Interest subsidy  at three percent per year, that is, opportunity  cost of capital is
assumed to exceed agricultural  interest rates by at least three percent.  Those
loans that are eventually repaid are assumed to be outstanding  for an average
of 2.61 years.  This implies an interest subsidy  over the entire life of the loan
of 7.8 percent of the principal.
2.  For every rupee of loans advanced, Rs 0.1 will eventually be lost to default.
The cost of this to the government is ten percent of the principal.
3.  A subsidy by the commercial  banks and/or the government to the salary cost
of operating the branches and/or credit societies.  Assuming  three persons per
branch worldng on agricultural  credit, one person per credit society and five
persons per land development  bank branch, each of them in the late 1970s
costing a total of Rs 15,000 per year to employ (salary and benefits).  And
assuming  about Rs 20,000 overhead personnel for the commercial  banks, the
cooperative  banks and NABARD. The total would be 200,000 x 15,000 =  Rs
3,000 million, or 14.5 percent per unit of credit advanced. We assume that
government  ultimately  pays half of this cost, or 7 .2 percent of the principal
advanced while the credit agencies  are able to cover the other half of the cost.
34Total cost to the government  of advancing  the loans =  (1)+(2)+(3)  =
7.8+10+7.2  = 25 percent of the principal over the lifetime of the loans.
Since the loans are outstanding  for an average of 2.61 years, the annual cost is
9.57 percent of the initial principal per year during which the loan is
outstanding.
Stated otherwise, if agricultural  credit rates were on average about 12.4
percent per year, the credit institutions would  have had to charge 22 percent to break even,
including all administrative  costs and coverage of losses.
We, therefore, compute the costs of the extra credit of Rs 2,055 million as
0.25 x 2,055 = Rs 513.8 million.  The extra agricultural income was estimated at RS 580.1
million, i.e.,  it exceeds the cost to the government  by about 13 percent.
How sensitive is this result to the assumption  made? The benefit cost ratio
will be overestimated  if (a) coefficients  between output and working capital are not fixed but
credit increases the capital intensity of production,  as clearly indicated in the econometric
results; (b) livestock output responds less to credit than crops; (c) if the govemment pays
more than 50 percent of the salary cost of running the system or the salary costs were
underestimated;  (d) if more than ten percent of credit advanced  becomes nonrecoverable;  and
(e) if interest subsidies  exceed three percent per year.
3SIt is not so easy to identify factors which could have led to the 1jnderegimation
of the benefit-cost  ratio.  Of course, the underlying  elasticity estimates  have standard errors
of about half the coefficient  size.  Given all these factors of uncertainty  we can conclude that
the government's  costs of providing these credit subsidies  have most likely been of the same
order of magnitude  as the benefits in terms of agricultural value added, but that the estimates
allow no firm conclusion of whether agricultural income benefits have exceeded government
costs of providing the credit or not.
Additionad  Private Costs
To generate the extra farm income using this extra credit, farmers also use
family labor.  For those family workers who are potentially  mobile between sectors their cost
has to be added to the cost of the government. It is not possible to divide family labor into
mobile and immobile  labor.  However, family labor is a very large cost element, therefore
any corresponding  adjustment  will tend to reduce extra agricultural  income benefits to less
than total private and government  costs.  An additional  private cost element not yet counted
is the annualized  cost of the fixed capital investments  (animals and machines)  which are used
to produce the extra output associated  with the credit.'-'  It has not been possible to
estimate the extra cost of these added inputs, since the corresponding  capital prices are not
available, nor the asset-specific  depreciation  rates.  Finally, there are real transaction costs of
the borrowers for obtaining the credit.  (Note that bribes and other transfers from borrowers
jLi  The cost of material  inputs  has already  been subtracted.
36to credit agency personnel  are not a social cost, only a transfer). Little hard data exLts on
transactions  costs in India.  However, for other rural credit systems estimates  of borrowers'
transactions  costs range from four percent in a program in Bolivia (Ladman, 1988) to over
30 percent in a program in Jamaica (Graham and Pollard, 1988). Partly offsetting  these
private costs are the incomplete  loan recoveries. They  are a benefit to the borrowers and a
cost to the lenders (government). In the calculation  of government  costs, we assumed these
losses to be ten percent of initial loan amounts. The transactions costs of borrowers in India
may, therefore, be commensur;ta with the transfers they receive from not paying back loans,
i.e.,  the two may cancel each other out in which case the cost to government would also be
an estimate of the entire social cost.
To conclude, the agricultural income gains associated  with agricultural  credit
have either been about equal or have fallen short of the government's costs of providing it.
Agricultural  benefits have not exceeded the social costs and may have fallen short of it.
Substantial  additional work would be required to firm up these tentative  calculations.
6.  SUMMARY  AND CONCLUSIONS
India has systematically  pursued a supply leading approach to increase
agricultural  credit.  The objectives  have been to replace moneylenders,  relieve farmers of
indebtedness  and to achieve higher levels of agricultural  credit, investment  and agricultural
output.  India's success in replacing moneylenders  has been outstanding: between 1951 and
371971 their share of rural credit appears to have dropped from over 80 percent to 36 percent.
According  to NSS data it may have dropped to as low as 16 percent by 1981, but that
estimate is in dispute (Bell, 1990).
However, institutional  credit is far from reaching all farmers.  Only about a
quarter of cultivators  borrow and long-term loans are received by no more than two percent
(Rath, 1987). The majority of small farmers have little access to credit and long-term credit
is highly concentrated  among large farmers.
Overall farm debt has probably not increased sharply in real terms as formal
credit has primarily substituted for credit from other sources.'  Moreover, with the rapid
growth of commercial  banks during the 1970s, the overall institutional system in 1981
mo.viiized  more deposits in rural areas than it lent to them.  Of course, enhanced deposit
services  are a useful service for the rural population. Nevertheless,  we must ask what has
been the impact of large rural credit and enhanced financial  services on agricultural
investment,  production and rural incomes. Our econometric  results suggest that the rapid
expansion  of commercial  banks in rural areas has had a substantially  positive effect on rural
nonfarm employment  and output.  The availability  of better banking facilities  appears to have
overcome  one of the obstacles of locating nonfarm activities in rural areas.
II/  The controversial results of the All-India Debt and Investment  Survey of 1981/82 suggests that real
indebtedness  may even have declined.
38In agriculture, the output and employment  effect of expanded  rural finance has
been much smaller than in the nonfarm sector.  The effect on crop output is not large,
despite the fact that credit to agriculture has strongly  increased fertilizer use and private
investment  in machines and livestock. High impact on inputs and modest  impact on output,
clearly mean that the additional  capital investment  has been more important  in substituting
for agricultural  labor than in increasing  crop output.
Nevertheless,  the overall impact  of rural credit and the  expansion  of the rural
financial  system on rural wages has been positive, as the creation of nonfarm employment
has added more to total employment  than has apparently been subtracted  by the substitution
of capital for labor in agriculture. And, therefore, wages have risen even for agricultural
workers, albeit at a very modest rate.
The supply-led  approach to agricultural credit, pursued over the last three
decades, has clearly been beneficial to current borrowers and farm households  formerly
indebted  to moneylenders. It has also spurred fertilizer use and investment  in agriculture.
But it has been less successful  in generating viable institutions. It has failed to generate
agricultural  employment. The costs of the policy to the Government  of India have been high
as portfolio  losses associated  with poor repayment have ultimately  to be borne by the
government  or one of its institutions. A comparison  of the agricultural income benefits with
the government cost of the extra agricultural  credit suggests that the former manages  to
exceed the latter by, at best 13 percent.  If the assumption  on cost of supplying  the credit and
39on repayment  rates underlying this calculation  was over optimistic, both government  cost and
the social cost of providing  the credit would have exceeded the agricultural income benefit.
The challenging  question, therefore, is the following: The expansion  of
commercial  banks to rural areas has had major payoffs in terms of nonfarm growth,
employment  and rural wages.  Could these benefits have been achieved without imposing
agricultural  credit targets on the commercial  banks and the cooperative  credit sector? Or,
did the commercial  banks only expand because they are forced to lend to agriculture? We
cannot answer these questions with the data at hand.
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43Annex 1.1  Table 1:
RANDOM EFFECT OF INSITMTIONAL  CREDIT ON
AGRICULTURAL INVESTMENT a/
(number of observations = 228)
Investment  in
Draft  Milk  Small  Pumps
animals  animals  Stocks  (Random
Explanatory  variable  (Random  effect)  (Random  effect)  (Random  effect)  effect)
Institutional  credit  (predicted)  b/  0.395  0.763  0.758  0.461
(1.558)  (5.091)*  (2.797)*  (3.633)*
Aggregate  real output  price  index  (lagged)  2.663  0.254  1.690  0.669
(3.548)*  (0.584)  (2.147)*  (1.857)*
Real  price,  of fertilizer  b/  -15.386  -12.641  -19.539  0.038
(-5.448)*  (-7.693)*  (-6.633)*  (0.028)
Real  urban  wage  b/  -0.142  -1.156  -3.772  0.024
(0.132)  (-1.855)*  (-3.335)*  (0.046)
Roads  b/  1.550  -2.530  1.464  -0.408
(1.714)*  (-4.425)*  (1.391)  (-0.879)
Canal  imigationb/  -0.718  -0.010  0.161  -0.174
(-1.233)  (-0.027)  (0.228)  (-0.570)
Primary  schools  b/  6.549  -1.057  0.031  -0.405
(3.846)*  (-0.973)  (0.015)  (0.472)
Electrification  b/  0.155  0.605  -1.099  0.079
(0.402)  (2.638)*  (2.630)*  (0.416)
Regulated  markets  b/  0.100  0.150  0.565  0.053
(0.230)  (0.593)  (1.205)  (0.253)
Rainfall  x 103  0.004  0.023  -0.007  0.001
(0.757)  (2.708)*  (-1.310)  (1.277)
Past  stock  -0.236  -0.006  -0.208  -0.094
(-15.076)*  (-0.125)  (-14.991)*  (-9.332)*
Year  -0.655  4.715  1.457  0.082
(-0.712)  (3.345)*  (1.724)*  (0.736)
Al-IAnnex 1. Tabe1:
RANDOM EFFECT OF INSTITUTIONAL CREDIT ON
AGRICULTURAL  INVESTMENT a/
(number of obserations  = 228) (Continued)
Investment  in
Draft  Milk  Small  Pumps
animals  animals  Stocks  (Random
Explanatory  variable  (Random  effect)  (Random  effect)  (Random  effect)  effect)
Year x cool months  0.146  -0.685  0.850  0.074
(0.994)  (-2.926)*  (6.192)*  (4.274)*
Year x rainy season  0.101  1.037  0.050  -0.007
(0.538)  (3.604)*  (0.287)  (-0.295)
Year x flood potential  0.015  0.071  0.172  0.003
(0.245)  (0.766)  (3.115)*  (0.356)
Year x irrigation  potential  0.005  -0.006  -0.022  -0.001
(0.634)  (0.560)  (-3.189)*  (-1.255)
Year x soil moisture  capacity  -0.072  -0.995  -0.179  -0.039
(-0.381)  (-3.468)*  (-1.040)  (-1.783)
Year x excess rain months  0.249  -0.804  -0.132  0.012
(1.528)  (3.188)*  (-0.873)  (0.631)
Constant  154.230  -135.614  170.9169  -2.127
(2.021)*  (-1.016)  (1.993)*  (-0.220)
F-statistic  16.417  26.404  16.258  6.201
Hausman-Wu  (Chi-square, 18 df)  15.039  17.268  20.338  13.988
Note:  T-statistics  are in parenthesis. Asterisk  refers to significant  level of 10 percent or better on a two-tail  test.
a/  A tractor equation  could not be estimated  with 2SLS  squares
b/  Coefficients  of these variables  are in elasticity  form.
Al-2Annex  I. Table  2:
EFFECT OF INSTITUTIONAL  CREDIT  ON FERTILIZER,  FARM
AND  NONFARM  EMPLOYMENT,  AND  AGRICULTURAL  WAGE
l  Fertilizer  Nonfarm  Farm  Agricultural
Explanatory  Variable  Conswmption  Employment  Employment  Wage
(Fixed  effect)  (Random  Effect)  (Random  Effect)  (Random  Effect)
Institutional  Credit (predicted)  a!  0.305  0.242  -0.050  0.061
(6.666)*  (5.257)*  (-2.074)*  (2.928)*
Aggregate  real output price index  0.044  -0.011  -0.006  0.041
(lagged)  a/  (0.835)  (-0.147)  (-0.153)  (1.671)*
*Real price of fertilizer  a/  -0.506  0.069  0.231  0.042
(-3.938)*  (0.117)  (0.755)  (0.700)
Real urban wage a/  0.176  0.050  -0.288  0.384
(2.356)*  (-0.225)  (-2.506)*  (10.927)*
Regulated  market a/  0.229  -0.116  0.035  -0.076
(2.723)*  (-1.965)*  (1.141)  (-2.077)*
Canal irrigation  a/  0.222  -0.030  -0.140  -0.064
(2.214)*  (-0.333)  (-2.961)*  (-1.430)
Rural electrification  a/  0.250  0.150  -0.038  0.077
(2.717)*  (3.169)*  (-1.547)  (1.805)*
Road length  a/  -0.638  0.040  0.228  -0.227
(-2.506)*  (0.213)  (2.312)*  (-2.196)*
Primary school  a!  0.570  -0.651  0.147  -0.196
(1.456)  (-2.780)*  (1.205)  (-1.192)
Annual rainfall x 103  a/  0.001  - 0.001
(0.692)  (2.605)*
Year  -1.337  10.070  -0.785  0.186
(-1.753)*  (3.373)*  (-0.330)  (12.387)*
Year x irrigation  potential  (0.019)  -0.060  0.066  -0.000
(3.004)*  (-2.463)  (3.429)*  (-0.460)
Year x excess rain months  -0.588  1.472  -1.650  0.018
(-4.133)*  (2.751)*  (-3.871)*  (1.197)
Year x soil moisture  capacity  0.563  -1.924  1.064  40.035
(4.087)*  (-3.420)*  (2.376)*  (-2.248)*
Year x length  of rainy season  0.085  40.990  0.568  -0.022
(0.553)  (-1.566)  (1.127)*  (-1.368)
Al-3Annex  1. Tsble 2:
EFFECT  OF INSTITUTIONAL  CREDIT  ON FERTILIZERS,  FARM
NONFARM  EMPLOYMENT,  AND  AGRICULTURAL  WAGE  (Continued)
-I  Fertilizer  r  Nonfarm  |  Farm  |  Agricultural
Explanation  Variable  Consumption  employment  Employment  wage
(Fixed  effect)  (Random  Effect)  (Random  Effect)  (Random  Effect)
Year  x flood  potential  -0.020  0.232  0.411  -0.004
(0.464)  (1.436)  (3.200)*  (0.907)
Year  x number  of cold  months  0.388  -0.384  0.777  -0.022
(2.514)*  ~~~(-0-754)  (-1.917)*  (1.605) (2.5 14)*
F-statistic  23.472  11.075  18.511
Hausman-Wu  (Chi-square)  60.206  15.508  19.074  15.070
Number  of observations  35.882  170  170  765
738
Note:  T-statistics  are in parenthesis.  Asterisk  refers  to significant  level  of 10  percent  or better  on a two tail test.
a/  Coefficients  are in elasticity  form.
A1-4Annex I.  Ta:g
EFFECT OF CO-OPERATI .'E CREDIT ON
AGRICULTURAL  INVESTMENT  ai
Investment in
Draft  Milk  SmaU  Pumps
Explanatory  variable  animals  animals  Stocks  (Random
(Random  effect)  (Random  effect)  (Random  effect)  effect
Co-operative  credit (predicted)  b/  0.135  0.583  0.842  0.396
(0.621)  (4.339)*  (3.589)*
(3.601)*
Aggregate  real output  price index (lagged)  2.S13  0.044  0.583
(3.397)*  (0.098)  1.581  (1.617)*
Real price of fertilizer  b/  -15.679  -14.049  (2.034)*  -0.829
(-5.503)*  (-8.157)*  (-0.593)
-21.318
Real urban  wage b/  -0.161  -1.476  (  -0.184
(-0.148)  (-2.262)*  7.068)*  (0.344)
Roads b/  -1.145  -2.161  -4.241  -0.247
(-1.342)  (-3.748)*  (-  (-0.543)
3.719)*
Canal irigation bt  -0.848  -0.096  -0.237
(-1.438)  (-0.229)  0.294  (-0.746)
(1.424)
Primary schools b/  6.274  -2.765  -1.587
(-2.131)*  0.131  (-1.609)
(3.360)*  (0.186)
Electrification  b/  0.955  0.328
0.229  (3.659)*  -2.787  (1.546)
(0.5S9)  (-1.252)
Regulated  markets  b/  -0.088  -0.128
0.072  (-0.314)  -0.529  (-0.568)
(0.158)  (-1.163)
Rainfal x 10'  0.279  0.010
0.045  (3.171)'  0.102  (1.575)
(0.972)  (0.205)
Past stock  0.029  -0.093
-0.239  (0.614)  -0.065  (-9.248)*
(-15.260)'  (-1.282)
Year  7.834  0.292




Al-SAnnex  1j Ta3:
EFFECT  OF CO-OPERATIVE  CREDIT  ON
AGRICULTURAL  INVESTMENT  a/ (Continued)
_______-investmInvestment  in  -
Draft  Milk  Small  Pumps
animals  animals  Stocks  (Random
Explanatory  variable  (Random  effect)  (Random  effect)  (Random  effect)  effect)
Year x cool months  0.159  -0.896  0.756  0.063
(1.038)  (-3.518)*  (5.310)*  (3.465)*
Year x rainy season  0.154  1.096  0.020  -0.005
(0.830)  (3.684)*  (0.118)  (-0.243)
Year x flood potential  0.009  0.129  0.209  0.006
(C.140)  (1.316)  (3.678)*  (0.851)
Year x irrigation  potential  0.008  -0.002  -0.023  -0.001
(1.161)  (-0.159)  (-3.554)*  (-1.102)
Year x soil moisture  capacity  -0.085  -1.762  -0.611  -0.090
(-0.342)  (-4.426)*  (-2.655)*  (-3.018)*
Year x excess rain months  0.302  -0.706  -0.121  0.018
(1.884)*  (-2.719)*  (-0.820)  (0.932)
Constant  158.932  -342.204  48.636  -15.702
(1.744)*  (-1.935)*  (0.487)  (-1.306)
F-statistic  25.691  17.179  6.288
Hausman-Wu  (Chi-square, 18 di)  16.622  19.748  21.291  15.868
14.074
Note:  T-statistics  are in parenthesis. Asterisk  refers to significant  level of 10 percent or better on a two-tail  test.
a/  A tractor equation  could not be estimated  with 2SLS  squares
b/  Coefficients  of these variables  are in elasticity  form.
Al-6Annex 1  Table4:
EFFECT OF CO-OPERATIVE  CREDIT  ON FERTILIZER,
FARM  AND  NONFARM  EMPLOYMENT,  AND  AGRICULTURAL  WAGE
I  Fertilizer  Nonfarm  Farm  Agricultural
Explanation  Variable  Consumption  employment  Employment  wage
_  (Fixed  effect)  (Random  Effect)  (Random  Effect)  (Random  Effect)
Institutional  Co-operative  0.394  0.056  -0.069  0.028
Credit  (predicted)  at  (4.554)*  (1.476)  (-2.514)*  (1.343)
Aggregate  real output  price  -0.021  0.000  |  -0.011  0.033
index  (lagged)  a/  (-0.217)  (0.005) |  (-0.219)  (1.353)  !
Real  price  of fertilizer  a/  -0.557  0.381  0.123  0.026
(-2.431)*  (0.675)  (0.317)  (0.424)
Real  ur½an  wage  a/  0.215  -0.009  -0.295  0.379
_________________________  - (1.594)  (-0.045)  (-2.029)*  (10.751)*
Regulated  market  a/  -0.042  -0.085  0.077  -0.064
(-0.236)  (-1.355)  (1.761)*  (-1.513)
Canal  irrigationa/  0.140  -0.101 1  -0.148  |  -0.075
(0.789)  (-1.272)  (-2.483)* 1  (-1.700)*
Rural  electrification  a/  0.484 |  0.148 }  -0.078  1  0.084
__________________________  -(2.740)*  (2.821)*j  (-2.136)*  (1.834)*
Road  length  a/  -0.895 |  0.573  |  0.277  |  -0.140
(-1.936)*  j  (3.522)*  1  (2.230)* [  (-1.362)
Primary  school  a?  -0.914 1  -0.395  0.330  |  -0.183
_______________________  _  i(-1.145)  (-1.599) [  (1.791)*  (-1.326)
Annual  rainfall  x 103  a?  -0.043  - - 0.026
(-0.246)  (2_559)*
Year  I  2.061  |  5.661 I  -5.897  1  0.166 1  (1.169)  (1.525) j  (-1.483) j  (1.708)*
Year  x irrigation  potential  0.014  |  -0.001 1  0.080  |  0.000
(1.293)  (.0.041)  (3.318)*  (0.465)
Year  x excess  rain months  -0.549  2.005  -1.624  0.027
(-2.21  1)*  (3.887)*  (-3.065)*  (1.860)*
I  _  __  |  |  |  |  11~~~~~~~~~~~I 
Year  x soil moisture  capacity  -0.505  -1.671  2.406  -0.038
I________  _  (-1.362)  (-2.083)*  (-2.809)*  (-1.816)*
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EFFECT OF COOPERATION CREDff  ON FERTILIZER,
FARM AND NONFARM EMPLOYMENT, AND  AGRICULTURAL WAGE (Continued)
Fertilizer  Nonfarm  Farm  Agricultural
Explanation  Variable  Consumption  employment  Employment  wage
(Fixed effect)  (Random  Effect)  (Random  Effect)  (Random
Effect)
Year x length  of rainy season  0.097  -0.707  0.661  -0.013
(0.357)  (-1.162)  (1.038)  (-0.822)
. _ . . ....*~r  T 
Year x flood potential  0.060  0.102  0.270  0.003
(0.716)  (1.528)  (1.528)  (0.568)
Year x number of cold months  0.172  0.102  |  -0.571  -0.019
(0.601)  (0.200)  (-1.095)  (-1.421)
F-statistic  62.963  17.972  11.390  *  3.207
Hausman-Wu  (CHi-square)  31.605  8.867  18.477  12.743
Number  of observations  738  170  170  765
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ASSUMPIOQN  QF BENEFIT-COST  ANALYSIS
1.  Interest subsidy.  3 percent a year outstanding
2.  Average length of outstanding  per loan that is eventually  repaid:  2.61 years
This calculation  assumes that, as in 1981/82,
*  2/3 of loans advanced  are short term with 6 month maturity
*  1/3 are medium term with 3 years maturity
*  1/3 are long term with 7 years maturity.
All loans have the same overdue and nonpayment  profile, derived from the data from the
primary agricultural  credit societies,
* 56 percent are repaid on time
*  11 percent are repaid one year late
*  11 percent are repaid two years late
*  11 percent are repaid three years late
o  10 percent are never repaid.
Under the assumptions,  short-term  credit  is outstanding  for an average of 1.1 year, medium-
term credit for 3.7 years, and long-term credit for 7.6 years.
3.  This can be combined with an interest subsidy  of 7.8 percent over the life of the loan, that
is, 2.61 percent to 3 percent.
4.  Loan losses are 10 percent of loans advanced.
Between 1980/81  and 1986/87  the following  were the average overdue ratios:
42.7 for land development  banks  )
46.5 for commercial  banks  )  An average 44 percent
42.0 for PACS  )
There are no changes in trends in overdues.
For PACs, between 1979/80  and 1981/82 (the last date available), 23 percent of overdue
loans were overdue for more than 3 years.  We will use this as the minimum  percentage of
overdues that are nonrecoverable. While some of these amounts may be recovered at a
future date, some of the loans that are overdue for up to 3 years will also ultimately  become
nonrecoverable. This is, therefore, a good estimate.
2-1If 44 percent of loans are overdue  and 23 percent of the overdue loans  cannot be recovered,
10.12 percent of demand is nonrecoverable.  This  means that of all new loans,  10.12
percent will eventually be lost.
5.  Subsidy to  rational cost ofbank  bMches  and credit societies.  Commercial bank
branches and cooperative  societies  are not covering  their costs of lending to agriciilture, as
their margins on funds advanced by NABARD  are slim ( perhaps 1.5 to 2 percent) and
differences between their deposit rates and lending rates are perhaps 6 to 7 percent at the
maximum. Costs of lending to agriculture exceed these margins.  Even if we assume that
fixed costs of branches can be charged to deposit mobilization,  there would still be cross
subsidy  by the bank to the cost of advancing  agricultural credit.
Annex 2 Table 1:
OTHER DATA USED IN THE ANALYSIS
Net domestic  Value of  Short-term  Long-term
product in  material  Employee  loans  loans
Year  agriculture  inputs  compensation  advanced  advance
1975  258,524  78,392  52,658  11,308  5,129
1976  263,590  85,175  56,658  13,163  6,806
1977  303,974  92,861  72,768  13,993  6,806
1978  310.560  97.667  16.270  8.721
Average  284,162  88,524  64,917  13,684  6,866
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